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THE FAST TRACK AND UNITED
STATES TRADE POLICY
Harold Hongju Koh*
In the waning days of Watergate and Vietnam, a legislative
innovation known as the "Fast Track" unexpectedly became the
keystone of modern United States trade policy. An expedited
legislative procedure found throughout United States foreign affairs statutes - particularly international trade, foreign assistance, emergency economic powers, and war powers legislation
- the Fast Track authorizes the President to initiate a foreign
affairs action (for example, negotiation of an international trade
agreement), but requires him to notify, consult, and subsequently submit the product of that action back to Congress for
final, accelerated approval.1 Under modified House and Senate
rules, Congress "promises" the President that it will automatically discharge the completed initiative from committee within a
certain number of days, bar floor amendment of the submitted
proposal, and limit floor debate, thereby ensuring the President
and our trading partners that the submitted legislative package
* Professor, Yale Law School. The ideas developed here borrow and build upon earlier work, particularly Harold Hongju Koh, History of the Fast Track Approval Mechanism, in GUIDE TO THE U.S.-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT: TEXT, COMMENTARY,
SOURCE MATERIALS I (Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Supp. 1991) [hereinafter Bello
& Holmer]; Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After LN.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986) [hereinafter
Koh, Congressional Controls]; Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets of International
Trade: A Perspectiveon the Proposed United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 201-18 (1987) [hereinafter Koh, Legal Markets], and presentations
made to the International Economic Law Interest Group at the 1991 Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law and the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on
"The Uruguay Round and the Future of International Trade." Judy Bello, Gary Horlick,
Alex Platt, Edmund Sim, and Saikrishna Prakash deserve many thanks for their exceptional comments and contributions, although none, of course, bears any responsibility for
the result.
1. See generally Koh, Congressional Controls, supra note * at 1211-21 (describing
how this technique has been used in the trade area). The Fast Track procedure has also
been included in several other foreign affairs statutes, including the foreign assistance
and war powers legislation. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69, 78-79 & n.38, 86-88 (1988) (citing statutes). For recent
proposals to employ Fast Track provisions for arms control and arms sales, see, e.g.,
Ronald A. Lehmann, Note, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A Congressional Fast
Track for Arms Control Treaties, 98 YALE L.J. 885, 896-903 (1989); Vanessa Patton
Sciarra, Note, Congressand Arms Sales: Tapping the Potentialof the Fast Track Guarantee Procedure, 97 YALE L.J. 1439, 1448, 1453-57 (1988).
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will be voted up or down without alteration within a fixed time
period.
The Fast Track serves two goals: at the same time as it enhances presidential negotiating credibility, it promotes presidential accountability to Congress. By guaranteeing swift legislative
approval of an unaltered trade agreement, the Fast Track assures our allies that the President can deliver on promises made
in his name at the international negotiating table. At the same
time, it guarantees Congress both information about, and early
and ongoing input into, presidential negotiation of important international trade agreements.
Since its inception in the Trade Act of 1974 (1974 Act), this
expedited legislative-approval mechanism has exhibited enormous versatility as a procedural device to secure congressionalexecutive cooperation in the management of United States international trade policy. 2 But the recent battle over the initiation

of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) talks
among the United States, Canada, and Mexico has not only
modified the way that the Fast Track will likely apply in the
future, but has also cast doubt on the Fast Track's viability as a
linchpin of future trade negotiations. Most intriguing, during the
most recent political struggle, NAFTA opponents lodged a new
policy objection against the Fast Track's use that directly challenged its supposed policy advantage: that its use does not enhance, but rather stifles, accountability and democratic decisionmaking in the forging of United States trade accords.
The NAFTA debate raised the tantalizing question whether
the Fast Track has or 'will soon outlive its usefulness for United
States trade policy. Part I of this article reviews and evaluates
the Fast Track's role during the most recent NAFTA episode
and enumerates the ways that Congress may continue to exert
influence over the substance of the accord in the months ahead.
Part II considers, and largely rejects, the "democracy" objection
lodged against the Fast Track, relying in part upon recent academic analyses of democratic decisionmaking in the legislative
process. Finally, Part III speculates more broadly on the Fast
2. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151-153, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), 19
U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193 (1988) (1974 Act). The best illustration came at the close of the 1979
Tokyo Round, when, thanks primarily to the Fast Track, the entire United States legislative process for approving the nine multilateral agreements negotiated there consumed
only thirty-four legislative days from presidential notification to final approval. See Koh,
CongressionalControls, supra note *, at 1203.
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Track's future in the evolution of United States trade policy and
suggests possible modifications of the Fast Track that would address those valid policy concerns that some have raised against
it.
I.

THE FAST TRACK:

How

IT WAS,

How

IT

Is

The current version of the Fast Track began life in the 1974
Act, which authorized the United States participation in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.' As I have chronicled elsewhere, the 1974 Act was wreathed with provisions that
manifested Congress' pervasive post-Watergate, post-Vietnam
distrust of unchecked executive discretion in foreign affairs:
specified negotiating objectives; sunset provisions on presidential
negotiating authority; extensive consultation, certification and
reporting 4requirements; and dramatic "judicialization" of trade
remedies.
The best-known of these executive discretion-controlling
devices were the 1974 Act's six legislative vetoes, whereby Congress delegated various statutory authorities to the President,
but retained the right by simple or concurrent resolution to subsequently approve or disapprove the result of his actions. The
legislative veto had numerous disadvantages, both constitutional
and political, and as everyone knows, the Supreme Court struck
it down less than a decade later.6 Yet despite these defects, the
3. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193.
4. The 1974 Act dramatically expanded citizen access to the trade process by: empowering private individuals to initiate proceedings directly against foreign industries by
private complaint, easing standing requirements, requiring executive branch action on
private complaints within strict statutory time limits, and subjecting that action to extensive judicial oversight. In the process, Congress created much of the modern United
States statutory law of import relief, including the modified escape clause, antidumping
and countervailing duty provisions, customs fraud penalties, statutory remedies against
infringement and unfair trade practices, and the now notorious Section 301. See generally Koh, Congressional Controls, supra note *, at 1205-06.
5. A legislative veto is a simple resolution approved by a majority of one house
("one-house veto"), or a concurrent resolution approved by majority votes in both houses
("two-house veto"), which purports to alter or override completed executive action. Both
types of vetoes are actions with legislative effect - in the sense that they alter the rights
and duties of those outside the legislative branch - but are not accomplished by formal
legislative procedures.
6. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court held that Article I, § 7 of the
United States Constitution requires that all actions with legislative effect be approved by
a majority of both the House and the Senate (the so-called "bicameralism" requirement)
and then presented to the President for his signature or veto (the so-called "presentment" requirement). Concurrent resolutions satisfy bicameralism, but not presentment;
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legislative veto effected a crucial political compromise: while the

President gained current legislative authorization for his acts,
his need to gain subsequent congressional approval (or to avoid
subsequent disapproval) provided assurances to Congress that
consultation would continue while his activities proceeded.
Similar policy concerns drove the creation of the Fast
Track. Before 1974, trade agreements had been accepted into
United States law either as "congressional-executive" agreements - authorized in advance by omnibus legislation, or after
negotiation by implementing legislation approved by a majority
of both houses of Congress - or less frequently, as "sole" executive agreements ostensibly accepted by the President on his inherent constitutional authority without legislative approval."
But each of these approval mechanisms had exhibited proven
policy defects. The 1965 United States-Canada auto pact and interbranch struggles during the Kennedy Round had demonstrated that sole agreements and congressional-executive agreements negotiated without prior legislative oversight offered
Congress too little input into the trade process.8 At the same
simple resolutions satisfy neither. The legislative veto's most prominent policy defect
was the freedom it gave members to avoid visible responsibility for their actions by
avoiding roll-call votes. For policy critiques of the legislative veto, see generally Carl
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119
(1977) [hereinafter McGowan]; David A. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982) [hereinafter Martin].
7. Yet another method of legislative approval - by formal treaty advised and consented to by two-thirds of the Senate - excluded the House altogether and accorded
primacy to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (which had jurisdiction over treaties), not the expert trade committees. Congress abandoned the use of formal treaties in
the trade field beginning with the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and the
United States accepted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) itself by
executive agreement. See Koh, CongressionalControls, supra note *, at 1197.
8. During the Kennedy Round, the Executive Branch accepted the GATT Antidumping Code over congressional objection, relying not on the President's delegated
statutory authority, but upon his sole constitutional authority as President to accept
executive agreements. Although Congress ultimately permitted domestic application of
Code provisions to the extent that they did not conflict with the wording or administration of domestic law, it retaliated by refusing to approve the proposed repeal of the
American Selling Price method of customs valuation, which the Executive had also negotiated, during the Kennedy Round, without congressional approval. Similarly, for more
than a year, the Johnson Administration secretly negotiated the 1965 United StatesCanada Automotive Products Agreement - which eliminated most bilateral transborder
tariffs on specified vehicles and auto parts and accessories - and then presented it to
Congress as a fait accompli. These skirmishes inspired Congress to approve the auto
pact with reluctant implementing legislation that strictly limited the President's future
ability to enter into such bilateral accords without previously consulting with Congress.
See generally Koh, CongressionalControls, supra note *, at 1197-1200.
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time, congressional-executive agreements negotiated pursuant to
prior authorization and subsequent approval by implementing
legislation afforded Congress too much freedom to undo trade
deals made by the executive through delay, amendment, and
filibuster.
The Fast Track, like the statutory delegation accompanied
by legislative veto, compromised between these extremes by offering a device that both authorized and constrained the President's negotiating discretion.9 Sections 102 and 151 of the 1974
Act delegated to the President broad advance authority to negotiate agreements reducing nontariff barriers and other trade distortions. These sections simultaneously obliged him to complete
numerous procedural steps before gaining access to the Fast
Track procedures, most significantly, notification of the House
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee
at least ninety days before entering any such agreement. 10 Once
these prerequisites were met, the statute modified the House
and Senate rules to add "anti-bottling," "anti-Christmas Tree"
and "anti-filibuster" provisions, producing a streamlined legislative procedure that would guarantee negotiated agreements and
implementing legislation an up-or-down vote without amendments within sixty legislative days after their introduction."
9. The original proposal was for trade agreements to be approved subject to legislative veto. For a history of the Fast Track's adoption, see Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the
Fast Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 471 (1992) [hereinafter Sim].
10. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1982). More specifically, the 1974 Act required the
President, before gaining access to the Fast Track procedures: to consult with both the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee and any joint
committee whose jurisdiction would be affected by such a trade agreement, see Trade
Act of 1974, § 102(c); to notify both houses ninety days before entering the agreement
and promptly thereafter to publish notice in the Federal Register of his intent to enter
such an agrement, id. § 102(e)(1); to supply to the International Trade Commission lists
of all articles whose duties might be modified, id. § 131(a); to seek information and advice from various departments and agencies, id. § 132; to arrange for and receive a summary of public hearings, id. § 133; to seek guidance from private sector advisers, id. § 135;
to negotiate and complete the tentative international agreement; to notify Congress and
consult with the key committees ninety days before signature, id. § 102(e); then to complete the final agreement and submit a draft of proposed implementing legislation to the
appropriate committees in the form of a normal bill, id. § 102(e)(2)(A).
11. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191-2193. The 1974 Act specified first, that a
negotiated nontariff barrier agreement and its draft implementing legislation would be
automatically discharged from committee consideration after forty-five legislative days,
with or without committee action, thus preventing any committee member from bottling
up the package to prevent it from coming to a floor vote. Second, the 1974 Act provided
that a bill or resolution approving each agreement would be placed on the appropriate
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On examination, the Fast Track procedure served four policy ends. First, it allowed Congress to overcome both the political inertia and the procedural obstacles that frequently prevent
a controversial measure from coming to a vote at all. Second, it
controlled domestic special interest group pressures that might
otherwise have provoked extensive, ad hoc amendment of a negotiated trade accord. Third, it bolstered the Executive Branch's
negotiating credibility with United States allies, which had suffered serious damage during the Kennedy Round, by reassuring
trading partners that negotiated trade agreements would undergo swift and nonintrusive legislative consideration. Fourth
and finally, it acted functionally like a one-house legislative veto
to control executive discretion, for it authorized either House to
block passage of a fully negotiated trade agreement simply by
voting down the agreement or its implementing legislation."
Since 1974, the Fast Track has undergone two substantial
modifications, first in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (1984
Act)'" and then the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (1988 Trade Act). 4 The 1984 Act, enacted in anticipation
of the United States' first comprehensive bilateral Free Trade
Agreements (FTA) with Israel and Canada, amended the Fast
Track procedure to incorporate a "committee gatekeeping" device.'" The amended procedure provided that if a country other
than Israel requested free trade negotiations with the United
calendar for a final vote on the floor of each house without possibility of amendment,
thereby averting the "Christmas Tree" phenomenon that is characteristic of much federal legislation. Third and finally, the 1974 Act limited debate on the floor of each house
to twenty hours and required that the package be voted upon within fifteen legislative
days, thereby forestalling the time-honored practice of one or more members of Congress
"filibustering" a proposal they oppose to prevent it from coming to a final vote in their
house. Slightly different rules apply to "implementing revenue bills," which go first to
the House (for a maximum of fifteen legislative days in committee and fifteen days on
the floor) and then to the Senate, for a maximum of fifteen days in committee and fifteen days on the floor). See id. § 151(e)(2).
12. Significantly, however, the Fast Track procedure did not itself constitute a legislative veto, because it required trade agreements to be approved by formal legislation
that was both bicamerally enacted and formally presented to the President, albeit on an
expedited basis. See generally Koh, Congressional Controls, supra note *, at 1216-17.
Nor did the Fast Track carry the legislative veto's proven policy defects. See supra note
6. Article I, § 5, clause 3 of the United States Constitution authorizes one-fifth of the
members present in each house to require a roll-call vote on any matter, thus making it
highly unlikely that individual members could conceal their votes on Fast Track approval resolutions.
13. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984) [1984 Act].
14. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) [1988 Act].
15. See 1984 Act § 401(a)(4), 98 Stat. 2948, 3014-3015.
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States, the President would be required to notify two "gate-

keeper" committees - the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees - and to consult with those committees for a period of sixty legislative days before giving the
statutorily required ninety-day notice of his intent to sign an
agreement.1 6 If neither committee disapproved of the negotiations during this sixty-day committee consultation period, any
subsequently negotiated agreement would receive Fast Track
legislative consideration. If, however, either committee disapproved the negotiations in advance, or either committee or house
refused to approve the postnegotiation package submitted by
the President, the Executive Branch would remain free to resubmit it for consideration under normal legislative procedures.
The 1984 Act's modified Fast Track procedure not only enhanced congressional influence over the negotiation of trade
agreements, it dramatically expanded the influence of the gatekeeper committees vis-a-vis the rest of Congress. In effect, the
modified Fast Track procedure afforded Congress three bites at
the apple. Under the committee gatekeeping procedure, a majority vote of either key committee could "derail" a presidential
proposal from the Fast Track - and in many cases, effectively
kill it - thereby giving the Executive strong incentives to consult with the committee's members at each step of the process.
Thus, the statutory requirement of a sixty-day prenegotiation
consultation period with the two committees secured their involvement in the Canada FTA negotiations months before formal talks began and allowed them to extract concessions from
the President as a condition of letting negotiations proceed. Second, the Administration's awareness that any negotiated agreement would ultimately return to the same committees for subsequent approval promoted continuing consultation as the
agreement evolved. Third and finally, either house retained the
option to vote down the fully negotiated agreement even after
its discharge from committee.
The extraordinary powers afforded to the two gatekeeper
committees under the 1984 Act were graphically illustrated at
the opening of the negotiations over the United States-Canada
16. The United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was not subject
to the committee gatekeeping process, became law subject to pre-1984 fast track procedures set forth in the Trade Acts of 1974 and 1979. See Israel-United States: Free Trade
Area Agreement, April 22, 1985, reprinted in 24 LL.M. 653 (entered into force Aug. 19,

1985).
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FTA. Shortly before the sixty-day prenegotiation consultation
period was scheduled to expire, a majority of the Senate Finance
Committee threatened to disapprove the negotiations, and even
urged the President to withdraw his request. After last-minute
presidential concessions and an eleventh-hour switch by one
Senator, the twenty-member committee ultimately divided
evenly on the motion to disapprove, permitting formal negotiations to proceed.1 7
As the Canadian episode demonstrated, the modified Fast
Track procedure empowered an ad hoc coalition of key committee members to jeopardize a proposed FTA that otherwise enjoyed general congressional support in order to signal their
broader discontent with the President's trade policies. Even
more significant, fallout from the incident continued months after formal FTA talks commenced as President Reagan later
made good on promises he made in exchange for the key Senate
votes necessary to avert committee disapproval. 18 These early
skirmishes placed United States negotiators on notice that they
could avoid future interbranch confrontation at the approval
stage of the FTA only by keeping Congress fully apprised of,
and involved in, the negotiations as they progressed.
Not surprisingly, the demonstrated effectiveness of the
modified Fast Track procedure in assuring congressional input
into the United States-Canada free trade negotiations inspired
Congress to fine tune that procedure even further to restrain
presidential negotiations of future trade accords. With regard to
both multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, the 1988 Trade
Act extended the President's nontariff agreement negotiating
authority for five years and extended the Fast Track privilege to
implementing legislation submitted within the next three years,
17. See generally Koh, Legal Markets, supra note *, at 211.
18. In exchange for senatorial support for the FTA, President Reagan reportedly
promised to take specific action against Canada over alleged softwood lumber subsidies.
Responding to this promise, only two days before formal FTA talks began, the United
States softwood lumber industry filed a petition alleging that Canada's administrative
pricing system for collecting stumpage fees constituted a subsidy that should be subject
to United States countervailing duties. The petition triggered a preliminary determination by the International Trade Commission that the Canadian practice had threatened
or caused material injury to the United States lumber industry. Under the rigid statutory deadlines for countervailing duty actions, the action would have required the President to impose duties upon Canadian lumber imports in early 1987, but for a last-minute
intergovernmental pact signed in December 1986, which achieved the same result via
imposition of a Canadian export tax. See generally Koh, Legal Markets, supra note *, at
212-13.
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with the possibility of a two year extension. 9 But the new law
also modified the committee gatekeeping procedure - which authorized the committees to block presidentialaccess to the Fast
Track - to enhance Congress' power in two respects: by reserving for either house the power to block extension of the Fast
Track authority past the original expiration date and for both
houses to derail already authorized agreements from the Fast
Track.
With regard to Fast Track extension, the 1988 Trade Act
declared a one-house disapproval rule: that the Fast Track procedure could be applied to implementing bills submitted after
May 31, 1991, but only if, before that date, the President requested an extension with reasons, and neither house of Congress adopted a nonamendable "extension disapproval" resolution reported out of the Senate Finance Committee and jointly
by the House Ways and Means, and Rules Committees. The
1988 modifications not only gave the House Rules Committee a
role commensurate with the two gatekeeper committees when
Fast Track extension is at stake, but also specified in haec verba
the wording that must be used in any Fast Track extension disapproval resolution.20 Second, the 1988 Trade Act established a
two house derailment procedure - now commonly called the
"reverse Fast Track" procedure - whereby the Fast Track approval procedure could be terminated at any time if the chairs
or ranking members of the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means or Rules Committee introduced, their
committees reported, and both houses then approved within any
sixty-day period, expedited resolutions disapproving use of the
Fast Track on the grounds "[t]hat the President had failed or
refused to consult with Congress on trade negotiations and trade
agreements in accordance with the provisions" of the 1988 Trade
Act.2" '
Additional disapproval and leverage options for Congress
derived from the oft-overlooked fact that, as a legal matter, the
Fast Track "emperor" has no clothes: the statutory Fast Track
procedures that modify internal house rules in no way legally
"bind" Congress. Although the various statutory Fast Track procedures contemplate and require certain modifications in inter19. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1103(b)(1)(A)-(B),

20. Id.

§ 1103(b)(5)(A)-(B).

21. Id. § 1103(c).

102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
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nal house rules, the Constitution specifically authorizes "[e]ach
House [to] determine the Rules of its Proceedings. 2 2 Thus, notwithstanding the formal incorporation of these provisions into
legislation, each house fully retained its constitutional discretion
to change those internal rules at any time and to deny the President Fast Track treatment even in cases where he could claim
statutory entitlement to it.
During the United States-Canada FTA negotiations, the
powerful maritime industry exploited this Achilles' heel by seeking a Senate resolution denying the Fast Track to any bill that
would have implemented maritime provisions of the FTA requiring national treatment. To avoid a confrontation with Congress over the issue, the Executive Branch and Canada agreed to
eliminate the FTA's maritime provisions in exchange for an
agreement by the Senate sponsors to drop their Fast Track denying resolution.
In sum, by the start of the NAFTA negotiations, it had become clear that the amended Fast Track afforded Congress at
least five major devices by which to express disapproval or exert
leverage over a trade agreement: (1) through gatekeeper-committee denial of initial access to the Fast Track, (2) through
one-house extension disapproval, (3) through the ongoing possibility of two-house derailment of an agreement from the Fast
Track under the reverse-Fast Track procedure, (4) through ad
hoc modification of Chamber rules to eliminate the Fast Track
and (5) through the final up-or-down vote on the implementing
legislation.
That all but the last of these required votes on the applicability of the Fast Track, not the merits of the trade accord in
question, illustrates how thoroughly the Fast Track has shifted
battles over the substance of United States trade policy onto the
battleground of procedure. Indeed, the Fast Track has become
so critical to United States trade policy that the timetables for
concluding both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round have come
to revolve largely around its availability.2 3 In addition, the trade
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
23. See Sim, supra note 9, at 493 ("As the USTR insisted for sufficient time before
the Fast Track deadline for introducing legislation (March 1, 1991) to build political
support in Congress, GATT negotiators scheduled the final ministerial meeting for December 1990"). Of course, other factors - most prominently, the European Community's
position on agricultural trade - have also affected the Uruguay Round's negotiation
timetable.
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laws now formally contemplate that congressional and constituent views about the substance of trade negotiations will be communicated to the Executive through two additional leverage
points: (6) direct congressional participationin trade negotiations, a practice that has expanded since 1974,24 and (7) several
layers of advisory committees that render private industry advice regarding the negotiations.2 5
The 1991 NAFTA struggle revealed the full extent to which
the 1988 amendments had fostered enhanced congressional control over the trade process. On September 25, 1990, President
Bush gave the statutorily required notification to the gatekeeper
committees of his intent to negotiate the NAFTA. But unlike
the United States-Canada FTA episode, in which the gatekeeper
committees exercised their influence by threatening to deny the
agreement initial access to the Fast Track - the first of the
seven leverage points named above - the NAFTA battle was
fought at the second stage: one-house extension disapproval.
On March 1, 1991, ninety days before the Fast Track would
expire, President Bush formally requested Congress to grant a
two-year extension of Fast Track rules for both the Uruguay
Round and the NAFTA. The President had previously informed
the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations
(ACTPN) of his extension request, and ACTPN overwhelmingly
reported in favor of extension.2 6
In the next two weeks, one-house extension disapproval resolutions were introduced in both the House and the Senate by
Representative Dorgan and Senator Hollings, respectively. 27 To
head off these resolutions, the chairs of the two key gatekeeper
24. See generally Trade Act of 1974, § 161, 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (mandating the dispatch of congressional delegates to trade negotiations). Senate advisers come from the
Finance Committee; House advisers from the Ways and Means, Energy, and Commerce
committees. 133 CONG. REc. H508 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1989); 133 CONG. REC. H375 (daily
ed. Feb. 23, 1989); 136 CONG. REc. H13274 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
25. See Trade Act of 1974, § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (concerning advice from private
sector); 1988 Act, § 1103(b)(3) (requiring Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) to submit to Congress no later than March 1, 1991, a report containing its view regarding extension of the Fast Track and regarding progress that has
been made in multilateral and bilateral negoatiations to achieve purposes, policies and
objectives established by Congress in the 1988 Trade Act).
26. Only the two labor representatives dissented from the pro-extension recommendation of the 44-member ACTPN. President,as Expected, Requests Extension of "FastTrack" Trade Authority Until 1993, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, 340, 341 (Mar. 6,
1991).
27. H.R. Res. 101, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Dorgan resolution); S. Res. 78, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Hollings resolution).
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committees, Representative Rostenkowski and Senator Bentsen,
urged the President to submit an "Action Plan" to Congress
that would deal, inter alia, with various environmental and la28
bor concerns raised against the potential NAFTA agreement.
On May 1, the President complied with their request, submitting a detailed Action Plan whereby he pledged to work with
Congress on drafting implementing legislation that would aid
dislocated workers, to negotiate safeguards for threatened American industries, and to avoid tampering with United States environmental laws.29
Following the Action Plan's submission, a number of key
Congressional members and certain environmental interest
groups announced their support for Fast Track extension, while
reserving the right to reject any eventual agreement. In particular, two key Representatives, Gephardt and Rostenkowski, introduced a sense-of-the-House resolution that listed objectives for
the Administration to consider while negotiating with Mexico,
asked the President to keep his promises made in the Action
Plan, and emphasized that Congress could later suspend the
Fast Track (under the reverse Fast Track procedure) if the Executive Branch failed to keep its promises.3 0 On May 14th, the
two gatekeeper committees voted by large majorities to reject
the extension disapproval resolutions before them.3 1 At the same
time, however, they made the crucial decision to not simply let
those resolutions die in committee, but instead to send them to
28. Letter to the President from Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, and Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Committee on
Ways and Means (Mar. 7, 1991), reprinted in

STAFF OF HOUSE

CoMm.

ON WAYS AND

ISSUES CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION OF A NORTH
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (Comm. Print 1991). House
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt wrote a similar letter to the President three weeks
-later, asking the Administration to detail its plans regarding, inter alia, wage disparity,
rules of origin, environmental protection, health and safety standards, labor mobility,
worker and human rights, and worker adjustment programs. See Letter to the President
from Representative Richard Gephardt, House Majority Leader (Mar. 27, 1991), reprinted in id. at 89-98.
29. He also promised that any agreement would include a gradual transition period,
rules of origin for goods, and discussion with Mexican officials regarding Mexican labor
laws. John E. Yang & Guy Gugliotta, Bush Seeks to Allay Fears on Free Trade Pact,
WASH. POST, May 2, 1991, at A27; 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, 713 (May 8, 1991).
30. H.R. Res. 146, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
31. The extension disapproval resolutions failed by votes of 9-27 before the House
Ways and Means Committee and 3-15 before the Senate Finance Committee. See Keith
Bradsher, Congress Panels Vote to Advance Free-Trade Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1991, at Al.
MEANS, EXCHANGE OF LET'ERS ON
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT,

1992]

THE FAST TRACK

the floor for plenary consideration. Within ten days, the House
and Senate rejected the extension disapproval resolutions before
3 2
them by votes of 231-192 and 59-36, respectively.
In retrospect, the 1991 Fast Track extension battle turned
on little-noticed language in the 1988 Trade Act that prescribed
the wording for one-house extension disapproval resolutions.3
That language did not appear to contemplate that Congress
could disapprove extension of Fast Track procedures for implementing bills for some trade agreements, but not others. This
capacious language allowed the President to couple extension of
the Fast Track for the NAFTA, which proved to be quite controversial, with Fast Track extension for the Uruguay Round accords, which, relatively speaking, enjoyed far broader congressional support. Had the two sets of agreements been decoupled
from one another, the President may have lacked sufficient legislative support to secure Fast Track extension for the NAFTA
alone.
Furthermore, although the congressional decision to extend
the Fast Track for both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
represented a substantial presidential victory, the episode also
established three informal precedents that the branches will
likely follow, even without specific statutory directive, when
seeking Fast Track treatment for future trade accords. The first
and most important was the Bentsen-Rostenkowski requirement
that, as a precondition to securing Fast Track extension, the
President submit some form of Action Plan to Congress placing
on the record his goals and intentions. Second, immediately after the House voted down extension disapproval, it passed by an
overwhelming vote of 329-85 the accompanying Gephardt-Rostenkowski "sense" resolution, which not only holds the President to his Action Plan commitments, but also calls on the
United States Trade Representative and other executive officials
to consult closely and on a regular basis (as has been the case
with the Uruguay Round) regarding the status of the negotia32. 137 CONG. REC. H3588-89 (daily ed. May 23, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. S6829 (daily
ed. May 24, 1991).
33. Pub. L. No. 100-418 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(5)(A)) (prescribing that the
resolution say only that the House or Senate "disapproves the request of the President
for the extension. . . of the [Fast Track] provisions of [the 1974 Act] to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into under section
1102(b) or (c) of such Act after May 31, 1991, because sufficient tangible progress has not
been made in trade negotiations . . .") (emphasis added).
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tions and the progress in achieving congressionally prescribed
objectives. 4 The gatekeeper committees' decision to send the extension disapproval resolutions to the floor, even after they had
been reported unfavorably, marked a third important precedent
favoring fuller congressional involvement in Fast Track extension decisions.3 By creating institutional custom, these precedents de facto amended the Fast Track procedure above and beyond the formal requirements of the 1988 Trade Act to ensure
even greater congressional input into the negotiation process.36
It would hardly be surprising if Congress chose to incorporate
one or all of them into its future statutes
implementing the Uru37
NAFTA
the
and
accords
Round
guay
One final point, which bears upon the discussion that follows in Part II: although Congress has now extended the Fast
Track's availability through June 1, 1993, it has hardly sacrificed
its continuing influence over the substance of the NAFTA. At
this writing, the agreement has cleared only the first two of the
seven formal hurdles described above, leaving Congress with numerous viable options for derailing an unsatisfactory accord
from the Fast Track. In addition to these hurdles, two new congressional possibilities have emerged for denying a completed
NAFTA Fast Track treatment: (8) the limited amendment option and (9) the nonapplicabilityof the Fast Track to regional
agreements. In April 1991 Senator Riegle offered the first of
these in the form of a resolution that would modify the fast
track to permit certain types of amendments in the areas of fair
34. H.R. Res. 146, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
35. Some members had suggested that the House Ways and Means Committee not
report the extension-disapproval resolution to the House floor. See David E. Rosenbaum,
Trade Issues Enter Crucial Political Phase, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at D1. Rather

than simply allowing the resolutions to die in committee, however, the committee chairs
elected to report the resolutions for floor action. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S6550-54
(daily ed. May 24, 1991) (comments of Chairman Bentsen).
36. Cf. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 70 (1990) [hereinafter KOH] (defining "quasiconstitutional custom" as "a set of institutional norms generated by the historical interaction of two or more federal branches with one another [that] represent informal accommodations between two or more branches on the question of who decides with regard
to particular foreign policy matters").

37. Indeed, the original Senate version of the 1988 Trade Act explicitly contained a
similar requirement: that Congress grant the President Fast Track authority subject to
the express condition that the United States Trade Representative submit to Congress
detailed trade policy statements that subsequently received legislative approval. See S.
490 §104(b)(2), (d)(2)-(3), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 133 CONG. REC.
S1851 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987).
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labor standards, environmental protection, rules of origin, dispute resolution, and worker adjustment assistance. 8 Representative John LaFalce raised the second possibility when he requested a General Accounting Office opinion on the question
whether the Fast Track extension, which is limited to nontariff
barrier agreements and bilateral agreements to reduce both
tariff and nontariff barriers, necessarily applies to a regional accord like the trilateral NAFTA.39 Representative LaFalce's letter
also raised the broader issue whether the Fast Track can legally
bind Congress not to offer amendments during future consideration of a trade agreement, suggesting that members opposed to
either the NAFTA or the Uruguay Round accords could invoke
a whole array of derailment possibilities beyond those already
envisioned by the procedures established by the 1988 Trade Act.
In an excellent recent article, Edmund Sim has suggested
three such derailment options that are currently available under
existing congressional rules: (10) their modification in the Senate
by unanimous consent procedures; (11) the remote possibility
that Congress could simply ignore its own rules; and (12) modification of the Fast Track by passage of new legislation.40 Encompassed under this last option is the ever-present possibility
that the recently granted two-year extension simply will not afford enough time for the Uruguay Round accords and/or the
NAFTA to be negotiated and concluded.
Should that eventuality arise, the President could face four
unpalatable options. First and most likely, he could ask Congress to extend the Fast Track yet again, which would almost
certainly lead to the imposition of new constraints on his negotiating discretion. Second, he could let the two-year extension period expire on June 1, 1993, then submit the completed agreements and their implementing legislation for congressional
approval under the "slow track" - i.e., normal unexpedited
congressional procedures - an option that our negotiating part38. S. Res. 109, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.; Sen. Riegle Introduces Resolutions to Modify
Fast-Track Procedure to Permit Amendments, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 17, at
600-01 (Apr. 24, 1991). Sen. Riegle could not offer his resolution as an amendment to the
rejected nonamendable disapproval resolution, but vowed to bring up and append the
resolution in a future year to a "must-pass" piece of legislation. Representative Levin
has introduced a similar bill on the House side. See David S. Cloud, Lawmakers Offer
Plans to Modify Fast Track, 49 CoNG. Q. 1047 (1991).
39. LaFalce Suggests Fast-Track Procedures Were Not Intended for Application
to NAFTA, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1181 (Aug. 7, 1991).
40. See Sim, supra note 9, at 506-18.
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ners would likely find unacceptable. 41 Third, the President could
submit the completed legislative packages to Congress after negotiation, but request that each House modify its rules to give
them ad hoc Fast Track consideration, notwithstanding the expiry of his statutory authority.
Fourth, most risky, and least likely, the President could
seek to accept the negotiated agreements on behalf of the
United States on his own constitutional authority, even without
legislative approval.42 In such a case, however, Congress would
almost certainly protest that the President lacked any inherent
constitutional authority to accept any aspect of a trade agreement providing for the modification or elimination of tariff barriers, which arguably fall within Congress' exclusive authority
under Article I of the Constitution to "lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises.

' 43

In response, the President might

claim that the 1988 Trade Act already grants him certain statutory proclamation authority over tariffs44 and that his inherent

constitutional authority permits him to accept at least those aspects of the negotiated package relating to nontariff barriers
without congressional approval of any kind. Should such an impasse arise, it seems highly unlikely that any of these disputes
could be judicially resolved if the two branches could not resolve
them politically. 45 As a political matter, however, such an asser41. President Johnson, for example, successfully employed this option with regard
to the 1965 United States-Canada auto pact. See supra note 8.
42. President Johnson chose this controversial course, for example, with regard to
the Antidumping Code during the Kennedy Round regime. See supra note 8. The President could also theoretically resurrect the treaty method of ratification, but such a
course would be extraordinarily unlikely, given the twin requirements of securing a twothirds vote in the Senate and House-enacted implementing legislation.
43. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Alternatively, Congress could assert that the various
trade acts have wholly preempted the trade negotiating field, thus eliminating any
residual presidential authority to act on his own in this area, and obliging the President
to comply with the clearly specified statutory terms.
44. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1102(a) (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2902(a)(1)(B)(ii)) (subject to certain limitations, the President may proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty, duty-free or excise treatment, or such additional duties "as he determines to be required or appropriate to carry out" certain trade
agreements).
45. Numerous judicial doctrines would potentially bar United States courts from
reaching the merits in such cases, including ripeness, the political question doctrine, and,
if the action were challenged by legislator plaintiffs, the doctrine of congressional standing. For judicial arguments in favor of Congress' position should this scenario arise, cf.
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F. 2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), afl'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 146 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Leventhal, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). To the extent that
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tion of presidential authority would be so sweeping and contrary
to customary practice, that it almost certainly would encounter
furious congressional opposition.
In sum, although the NAFTA has cleared the earliest derailment hurdles, neither its political future, nor the Uruguay
Round's, is assured. At the same time as the NAFTA episode
gave the President a temporary victory, it exposed significant
cracks in the Fast Track's armor, which current and future opponents may yet exploit. Not only are some derailment possibilities explicitly envisioned by the procedures established by the
1974, 1979, 1984, and 1988 Trade Acts, others stem from the reality that, notwithstanding these statutes, neither Congress nor
the President are legally bound to comply with the Fast Track.
At bottom, the Fast Track rests on a grand illusion. As a
political device, the Fast Track has worked because it has appeared to bind both Congress and the President to a future
course of action. Just as Ulysses tied himself to the mast to
avoid being seduced by the Sirens, once certain cooperative preconditions are met, both the President and Congress commit
themselves to an expedited legislative procedure to avoid being
seduced by future political exigencies. As a legal matter, however, the rules that comprise the Fast Track approval mechanism are internal house rules, not legislation. Thus, the Fast
Track does not legally bind the two branches so much as it
erects a legislative framework within which political accommodation can occur. 46 As the figure below shows, that framework
affords Congress numerous leverage points at which it may exercise influence over the substance of the agreement.
such adjudication would turn on judicial interpretation of the trade laws, Congress could
seek to override presidential claims of nonjusticiability by citing the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986),
which proclaims: "[U]nder the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is
to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision
may have significant political overtones." Id. at 230.
46. Like the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988), and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-223, Title II, § 202, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988),
the Fast Track constitutes what I have called elsewhere "framework legislation": a law
"that Congress enacts and the president signs within their zone of concurrent authority
[over international trade], not simply to 'formulate policies and procedures for the resolution of specific trade problems, but rather . . . to implement constitutional policies'"
favoring power-sharing among the branches in international trade. KoH, supra note 36,
at 69-70.
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SUMMARY OF LEVERAGE POINTS IN THE FAST TRACK
PROCESS
Before Negotiations
President notifies House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees and private
advisory committees of intent to negotiate Free Trade Agreement.

I

Advisory Committees decide whether to su port Fast Track request (device 7).
Gatekeeper Committees vote on whether to deny the FTA initial access to the Fast
Track (device 1).
Before May 31, 1991
President was obliged, by March 1, 1991, to request two-year extension, with reasons,
and Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations was similarly obliged to
submit a report opining whether the extension should be approved (device 7).
Presidentsubmitted action plan (not mandated by statute).
Either house had opportunity to disapprove extension of the Fast Track for two years
(device 2).
Gatekeeper committees and House Rules Committee reported extension-disapproval unfavorably, and resolutions were voted down on the floor.
House passed "sense" resolution enumerating NAFTA negotiating objectives.
During Negotiations
Congressional Observers may participate in trade negotiations (device 6).
President must give notice at least 90 calendar days before agreement is initialled.
After Negotiations
Both Houses
- engage in nonhearings and nonmarkups before implementing bill is formally
submitted;
- under reverse-fast track procedure, retain option of two-House derailment of agreement from the Fast Track if President fails to consult (device 3);
- may modify the Fast Track by passage of new legislation (device 12).
EitherHouse
- may engage in ad hoc modification of Chamber rules by separate rules resolution to
eliminate the Fast Track (device 4) or to permit amendment (device 8);
- could ignore its own standing rules (subject to points of order) (device 11);
- may simply vote down the implementing legislation after President formally submits
it (device 5). Legislation will be automatically discharged from gatekeeper committee
within 45 legislative days after President submits implementing bill to Congress, and
voted on the floor in each house within 15 legislative days after discharge. (Slightly different rules apply to implementing revenue bills, which go first to the House and then to
the Senate).
The Senate
- may modify Fast Track procedures at any time through unanimous consent procedures (device 10).
Any Individual Member
- could conceivably attempt to block consideration of NAFTA by raising point of order
claiming the nonapplicability of the Fast Track to regional agreements (device 9).
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As a procedural device that imposes a statutory structure upon
the hazy constitutional battleground between overlapping presidential and congressional trade jurisdictions, the Fast Track creates moral commitments, mutual assurances, credible threats,
and settled expectations among the branches in the trade field.
By so doing, it has made possible a modus vivendi that allows
both branches to achieve their shared policy goal: interbranch
consultation and cooperation in the negotiation and conclusion
of international trade accords.
II.

UNPACKING

THE

"DEMOCRACY

OBJECTION"

TO

THE

FAST

TRACK

One cannot remain a stalwart advocate of the Fast Track
after the NAFTA episode without considering and rebutting a
new policy objection that surfaced during the recent Fast Track
extension struggle. That objection was voiced by Joan Claybrook, President of Public Citizen, in the following way:
It's an undemocratic provision ....
And it undermines the
whole concept of our national government that has checks and
balances so that the public is protected as those checks and
balances do their work. The administration wants fast track to
put the Congress in the position of either having to vote "yes"
or "no" and not being able to have any leverage on the decision-making in these talks.4
Upon examination, this "democracy objection" to the Fast
Track really breaks into two: what I shall call the "no-amendment objection" and the "accountability objection." The first,
and in my view, more serious objection challenges the Fast
Track procedure as undemocratic because it permits no amendments. The second objection claims that the Fast Track consti47. News Conference: Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor and the Environment, Federal Information Systems Corporation, May 2, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, Current File [hereinafter Claybrook]. See also Letter to the Editor from
Lori Wallach, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen Congress Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1991,
A28, col. 5 ("The Fast Track procedure allows Congress only a yes or no vote on a completed trade agreement. Members can do nothing to correct weak safety and environmental provisions in an otherwise strong trade agreement. Congress will be faced with a
big lose-lose situation; vote no, and they lose the entire agreement; vote yes and they
undermine United States health and safety laws."); Clyde H. Farnsworth, Revival of
GATT Talks Stirs PoliticalFight in U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1991, at D1 (statement

of Thomas R. Donahue, AFL-CIO) (Fast Track "seriously limits both public and Congressional involvement in discussions with Mexico and dilutes the lawmaking authority
of Congress").
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tutes an abdication of congressional responsibility because Congress delegates negotiating authority to the President without
reserving any effective means of rejecting unsatisfactorily negotiated agreements. Both objections recall similar criticisms lodged
against the legislative veto when it was the tool-of-choice in
trade legislation.4"
The "democracy objection" warrants inspection for three
reasons. First, unlike objections that go to the substance of
agreements that result from the Fast Track procedure, this objection goes to the very nature of the Fast Track procedure itself. Hence, it can and almost certainly will be heard again, both
from opponents of the substantive accords likely to emerge from
the Fast Track and from advocates of those accords who share
their opponents' process concerns. Second, if valid, the criticism
would undermine the Fast Track's central policy advantage: to
increase, not decrease, the accountability of the political
branches to one another, and indirectly to the people. Third, the
peculiar objection lodged against the Fast Track differs quite
strikingly from other kinds of "democratic" objections being
lodged these days, by legal scholars, economists, and public
choice theorists, against the legislative process as a whole. 49 The
new objection is not the now-familiar one that the legislative
process as a whole is not perfectly democratic because of legislator self-interest and rent-seeking, agenda control, strategic voting, and what economist Kenneth Arrow calls "cycling." 50 Instead, the Fast Track's critics claim that the specific
48. Cf. McGowan, supra note 6, at 1147 (legislative veto promotes congressional
"tendency... to 'pass the buck' . . . through profligate delegation and then to join
constituents in scoffing at the agencies' handling of the difficult matters"); Martin, supra
note 6, at 271-73 (legislative veto "tempts members of Congress, pressed hard by affected
interest groups, to act irresponsibly," because "a legislative veto generally calls for a sin-

gle up-or-down vote on the full package of regulations, with all their attendant details").
49. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1990) (reviewing this massive literature). See also KENNETH J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter ARROW]; JAMES
BUCHANAN

& GORDON

TULLOCK,

THE

CALCULUS OF CONSENT

(1962); William N. Eskridge,

Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term -Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1984).
50. Nobel Laureate Arrow's famous theorem, derived from Condorcet, shows that
when there are three or more exclusive alternatives, a majority voting system can produce any of them depending largely upon how these alternatives are introduced and considered. Arrow's work raised the troubling possibility that the whole concept of the public interest might be incoherent, because political outcomes reflect strategic voting, not
collective utility. See generally ARROW, supra note 49.
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modifications of ordinary legislative procedures for trade agreements somehow reduce the democratic nature. of the resulting
decisionmaking. Let me examine and unpack both the noamendment objection and the accountability objection in turn.
A.

The No-Amendment Objection

At bottom, the Fast Track procedure differs from normal
legislative process in six respects: it is an accelerated process
that results from self-imposed congressional limits upon ordinary committee deliberation,committee and floor amendment,
and filibuster, that effectively bundles disparate substantive
provisions together in a take-it-or-leave-it package.
It should be self-evident that none of these features, by itself, is inherently undemocratic. An accelerated legislative process may force interest groups to band together and lodge their
objections earlier and faster than they otherwise would, but so
long as the process is not unduly truncated, acceleration need
not silence interested voices. Similarly, shortening the period for
committee deliberation may have the disadvantage of preventing
the most expert legislators from considering a trade bill at
length, but in exchange, it enhances democracy by preventing
one committee (or one interested member) from bottling up a
bill, thus ensuring that the bill will be voted on the floor.5 1 Nor
is a no-amendment rule inherently anti-democratic. Many controversial bills, especially revenue bills, are brought to the floor
under either "closed rules," which allow no amendments on the
floor, or restrictive rules, which provide that only a certain number of amendments are in order. 2 Similarly, democracy does not
require unlimited floor debate. If a filibuster could not be closed
off without offending democracy, all bills could be held hostage
by a single opposing Senator. The bundling together of disparate
legislative proposals, which are then subject to an up-or-down
51. Other methods exist to circumvent committee power, particularly the discharge
petition, see WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
133-34 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OLESZEK], but the Fast Track provides a more certain
device for assuring discharge after forty-five days of expert committee deliberation.
52. OLESZEK, supra note 51, at 126. When the House Acts through suspension of
rules, floor amendments are not permitted. A recent study by the Congressional Research Service shows that from 1979-88 the House took 587 roll-call votes on suspension
of the rules out of a total of 4823 roll-call votes, or approximately 12% of the total..
Undelivered Testimony of Louis Fisher, Prepared for Hearings on Fast Track Procedures in Trade Legislation, House Committee on Small Business, Apr. 24, 1991, at 9 (on
file with author).
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veto, frequently occurs throughout the legislative process, particularly in the context of continuing budget resolutions."
Finally, even if some combination of these features rendered
the Fast Track undemocratic, that concern would be alleviated
by the fact that all of them are congressionally self-imposed. In
the original language of the 1974 Act authorizing the Fast Track,
Congress explicitly declared that it could change its own procedures at will.5 4 This language operates, in effect, as a safety valve
for democracy, for if any feature of the Fast Track rules operates to stifle particular views, those rules can be altered by a
simple majority vote in each House. Yet far from altering those
rules, majorities in both houses have voted for the Fast Track on
five separate occasions: when they enacted the Trade Acts of
1974, 1979, 1984, and 1988 and most recently when both houses
voted down extension disapproval resolutions in May 1991.
What, then, is the core of the complaint? At base, it is that
the Fast Track disables Congress from holding formal hearings
on implementing bills after trade accords have been submitted
by the President, and from offering amendments to those bills
either in committee or on the floor. As a result, critics argue,
some amendments that would otherwise enjoy majority support
in both chambers will never come to the floor for a vote. Moreover, critics claim, the Fast Track puts pressure on members to
accept agreements as originally drafted, even if they have substantial concerns with them, because their only other option is
to vote against an agreement whose negotiation they have approved and which has taken many long years to negotiate. As
Senator Ernest Hollings put it: "Fast Track operates like a gun
'55
to our heads - no amendments, no reservations.
The democracy objection cannot rest on the absence of
hearings, for in fact "nonhearing hearings," "nonmarkup markups" and "non-conference conferences" have been familiar fea53. Continuing resolutions are funding devices that are enacted whenever Congress
is unable to pass one or more of the thirteen regular appropriations bills by the end of
the budget year. Such resolutions are frequently enacted subject to internal rules that
preclude debate and amendment, and are then presented to the President (usually one
day before the end of an appropriations cycle). See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 143 (1975); Neal E. Devins, AppropriationsRedux: A CriticalLook at the
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DuKE L.J. 389.
54. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191(a) (1988).
55. David S. Cloud, Democrats Weigh the Politics of Battling Bush and Mexico, 49
CONG. Q. 660 (1991) [hereinafter Cloud, Democrats Weigh].
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tures of the Fast Track process since the very beginning.5 6 Thus,
the objection must reduce to a complaint about the no-amendment rule. Yet upon reflection, two points emerge. First, no legislative system can function without some procedure for limiting
amendments (and for limiting the time for debate thereon); otherwise, the process would degenerate into one in which recalcitrant members could force interminable debate by offering infinite numbers of amendments. The House Rules Committee,
which proposes the rule under which a bill is voted upon by the
full House, exists precisely to provide such amendment-limiting
procedures. 7
Second, the Fast Track does not so much affect whether an
agreement can be amended as when it can be amended. In the
typical situation, the Executive Branch develops an initial strategy for negotiating with our trading partners, but the amended
Fast Track process encourages the President to alter that strategy over time through consultation with private industry groups
and through dialogue with a Congress (especially the key committees) that is empowered to exercise the full panoply of derailment possibilities outlined in Part I. The ensuing process of legislative and executive dialogue does lead to amendment of the
accord, but by amending the Executive Branch's negotiating
strategy before actual negotiations begin and while they are
proceeding, rather than after they have been completed. In
short, the Fast Track may be thought of as a process whereby an
agreement is subject to essentially as much amendment as one
approved under the slow-track, but with the major congressional
amendments to the agreement coming before or during negotiations. 8 That process occurs against both branches' background
awareness that a disgruntled Congress possesses full legal power
to step in and amend an agreement that it does not like. Thus,
56. See JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE TOKYO ROUND:

JEAN-VICTOR Louis & Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING

NATIONAL

CONSTITUTIONS

AND

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC RULES

(1984); I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 65 (1986)
(describing this process).
57. On the Senate side, the body usually proceeds by Unanimous Consent agreements in which Senators all agree to follow certain procedures in the agreements and to
ignore standing rules. See OLESZEK, supra note 51, at 122, 185.
58. During the NAFTA episode, Congress effectively forced such prenegotiation
amendments by calling for the President's action plan and by the House passing the
Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution, H.R. Res. 146, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), at the
same time as it rejected the extension disapproval resolution. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37.
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as Representative Gephardt recently put it, "[tihe bottom line is
that the president not only has to earn [F]ast [T]rack on the
front end, he has got to keep on earning it. If Congress grants
him [F]ast [T]rack, that not the end of the process, it's just the
beginning."5 9 What this means in the context of NAFTA, again
in Gephardt's words, is that "[i]f the administration sends to
this Congress a trade treaty that trades away American jobs, or
tolerates pollution of the environment or abuse of workers, we
can, and we will, amend it or reject it. ' ' 6°
B.

The Accountability Objection

The accountability objection takes a somewhat different
form: that Congress, by delegating negotiating authority to the
President under the Fast Track, subject only to a later up-ordown vote, escapes responsibility for enacting the President's
negotiated package. Under this view, once the President has
gained access to the Fast Track, Congress is reduced to a spectator in the negotiating process and has little ultimate choice but
to accept the negotiated result." Thus, the Fast Track undercuts accountability in the same way as any blank-check delegation does. Moreover, members can have it both ways and disguise their positions from their constituents. In theory, they
could vote to extend the Fast Track (while claiming to have no
view on the merits of the subsequent accord), then later vote to
support the subsequent agreement, claiming that they do not
favor it, but that too much energy and resources have been invested to reject an otherwise unamendable agreement.
This objection overstates both the transparency of ordinary
legislative procedures to voters and the extent to which the Fast
Track, once triggered, remits Congress to a passive role in the
agreement-making process. If trade agreements were approved
under ordinary, rather than Fast Track procedures, the opportunities for members to engage in obfuscatory tactics would multi59. Gephardt Presses For Inclusion of Labor, Environmental Issues in Mexico
Trade Talks, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (April 12, 1991).
60. Gephardt Backs Fast Track, 49 CONG. Q. 1181 (1991). Notwithstanding Representative Gephardt's threats, however, Congress could not amend the NAFTA without
first modifying the Fast Track rules that currently govern its ratification.
61. Karen Tumulty, Groups Oppose "Fast Track" To Negotiate Pacts, L.A. TIMES,
March 21, 1991, at D2 (statement of Ralph Nader) (Fast Track is "an obscure legislative
procedure that allows Congress to go on autopilot while the Administration negotiates
sweeping trade agreements that can gut vast stretches of United States environmental,
health and safety laws").
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ply, not diminish. Members could add so-called "killer" amendments, 2 substitute amendments, 3 and riders to implementing
bills,64 or employ points of order 5 and motions to recommit bills
to committee,"6 all with an eye toward obscuring their true position from the public. The more complicated the available procedures, the greater the ability of any single member to avoid public accountability for her actions.
By contrast, the straight up-or-down roll-call vote required
at the end of the Fast Track imposes an irreducible minimum of
political accountability. In the end, the member must declare
himself for or against the trade agreement, warts and all. Indeed, it is precisely because the member knows that he will
eventually be held accountable for the entire package that he
gains an incentive to take interest in a trade accord earlier in the
negotiation process, to ensure that some feature of the agreement that is offensive to him or his constituents will not be enshrined in the final accord.
Spread over many members, this incentive explains why
Congress has not left the Fast Track alone, but rather, has continually amended it since 1974. As Part I described, through
both formal legislation and informal practice, Congress has
steadily increased the number of intermediate leverage points
through which it can exercise influence over the substance of
trade accords. These leverage points, most of which are subject
to roll-call votes, subject a member's actions with regard to an
evolving trade agreement to considerable public scrutiny. Cer62. A killer amendment is one that is likely to be adopted, but which is so offensive
to the bill's manager that the manager would rather see the bill fail than see the
amended bill enacted. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
406-07 (1989) [hereinafter TIEFER]. Members often strategically support both a killer
amendment and the underlying bill, knowing that the adoption of the killer amendment
could lead to the death of the other.
63. Substitute amendments rewrite an entire bill, but keep the same bill or act number. See id. at 407-11. This tactic allows members to support a bill publicly while its

substance changes dramatically.
64. See OLESZEK, supra note 51, at 303. Riders are nongermane amendments to bills.
A member can vote against a bill carrying such a rider explaining that he opposes the
bill, the rider, or both.
65. A point of order is a means whereby a member may object to the alleged violation of a chamber or committee rule. Such procedural objections are often used to disguise substantive ones. See generally KOH, supra note 36, at 177 & 308 n.83; TEFER,
supra note 62, at 24.
66. A motion to recommit to committee formally asks the committee to take back a
bill for re-evaluation, but often effectively signals the bill's death. See OLESZEK, supra
note 51, at 301.
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tainly, there were many members who would have preferred to
avoid taking a public stand on the NAFTA before negotiations
had even begun. But the introduction of extension disapproval
resolutions in both houses and the gatekeeper committees' decisions to send those resolutions to the floor obliged all members
to take a stand on Fast Track extension, and by implication on
the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round as well. Thus, the Fast
Track extension fight promoted accountability by clarifying
members' positions and forcing interest groups to coalesce in
support or opposition to the NAFTA.
Nor can critics persuasively argue that the Fast Track process offends accountability by overly delegating to the President
constitutional powers that Congress is obliged to exercise. The
Supreme Court long ago made clear that the largely moribund
nondelegation doctrine does not apply with equal force in the
foreign affairs realm.17 Furthermore, the various Trade Acts enacted since 1974 certainly contain detailed substantive standards, as well as an unusual range of procedural safeguards, sufficient to immunize them against any claim of an
unconstitutional delegation. 8
The Fast Track critics' most persuasive critique is of the
President's tactic of bundling disparate trade proposals, both
within the NAFTA, and between the NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round and placing them before Congress for a single vote.
Taken to extremes, they argue, bundling makes it too painful for
Congress to vote against a completed trade accord, in much the
same way that the bundling of many appropriations bill into a
single continuing resolution virtually immunizes such a resolution against a presidential veto. For that reason, opponents muster policy arguments against the Fast Track similar to those
mustered by advocates of a presidential line-item veto. 9
67. Compare Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating domestic statute on nondelegation grounds) with United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("congressional legislation which is to be made effective
through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not
be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.").
68. See supra note 10.
69. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, FourFaces of the Item Veto: A
Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 449 (1990) (making arguments
against legislative bundling). Opponents of the Fast Track cannot make the same constitutional arguments, however, because the text of the United States Constitution appears
to preclude a presidential line-item veto, but has nothing to say about Congress' right to
unbundle. See generally Letter from Laurence H. Tribe and Philip Kurland to Senator
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Despite their superficial similarities, important differences
ultimately separate trade agreements from continuing resolutions. As a political matter, continuing resolutions are most
"veto-proof" when the government will shut down unless the
President signs the continuing resolution. No similar pressure
operates to compel the Congress to approve the NAFTA or the
Uruguay Round accords. Moreover, unlike the President, who
lacks a line-item veto, Congress retains the power under its rules
to unbundle agreements and vote on them separately. Finally,
even if unbundling proves politically difficult, history demonstrates that the Senate has not been afraid to reject comprehensive, painstakingly negotiated treaties in the past, ranging from
the Treaty of Versailles to the Charter of the International
Trade Organization.70 In short, critics simply have not made a
persuasive case against the use of the Fast Track procedure on
the grounds of political accountability. So long as Congress remains an active participant in the Fast Track process, as Part I
demonstrates it must, members will remain accountable for their
votes and actions.
C. Congress' Real Complaint
On closer inspection, the Fast Track's critics are really making an objection quite different from the "democratic deficit"
claim outlined above. At base, they are not claiming that the
Fast Track process is inherently undemocratic, but rather, that
its use tends to give the President greater leverage and influence
over the substance of trade negotiation processes than he would
have under ordinary procedures. As Joan Claybrook recently put
it, "this anti-democratic procedure is being used as a ramrod to
antitry and get the Congress to submit to the administration's
' 71
agenda."
safety
and
anti-health
regulation,
To test this proposition, we can look to recent political science literature studying this very question in an analogous legisEdward Kennedy, reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. S14,387 (daily ed. Oct. 31 1989) (arguing
that "any attempt to exercise such a [presidential] 'line-item veto' would clearly be unconstitutional"); Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Note, Is a PresidentialItem Veto Constitutional?,
96 YALE L.J. 838 (1987).
70. In the case of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II accord, the President
chose to not even submit the treaty to the Senate because he knew it could not be ratified after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See generally Michael Krepon, The Politics of Treaty Ratification (Stimson Center Working Paper) at 9, 35-36 (Jan. 1991) (on
file with the Brooklyn Journal of InternationalLaw).
71. See Claybrook, supra note 47.
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lative context. In one recent study, political scientists used
mathematical models to study the relative influence that a congressional committee has when it reports its bill to the floor of
the House or Senate under an open (i.e., freely amendable) or
closed (no amendment) rule.7 2 That study confirmed the intuition that a committee gains substantially more leverage over the
final content of legislation when it reports the legislation under a
rule that permits no amendments.73
The Fast Track procedure places the President in essentially the same position as the committee that introduces its legislation under a closed rule, inasmuch as he also has the ability
to introduce an agreement without any subsequent congressional
amendments. 4 By analogy to the committee which operates
under a closed rule, the Fast Track enables the President to obtain trade agreements that are closer to his policy ideal than if
amendments were freely allowed, and thus effectively affords
him greater influence over the final legislative outcome. Viewed
in this light, the Fast Track's critics may have a valid concern,
but it is not about democracy. Their central concern is that the
Fast Track gives the President greater ability than he would
otherwise have to shape the substance of the trade agreement,
and thus cuts into Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce
and international trade. Agreements enacted under the Fast
Track thus tend to reflect the President's trade priorities and
agenda more closely than Congress'. This concern deepens if the
President is not only able to bundle various parts of the same
agreement together, but also to bundle together two completely
different agreements for a single vote (as occurred de facto,
when the recent Fast Track extension vote applied to ratification of both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round).
Certainly, this concern can be overstated. Most significantly, it does not account for all of the procedural avenues described in Part I whereby Congress may shape the substance of
an accord before it returns to Congress in unamendable form.
During the United States-Canada FTA negotiations, for exam72. See Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power
of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and SophisticatedBehavior, AM. J. POL. Scl. 741
(1983).
73. See id. at 759 ("Under the closed rule, .
more sophisticated committee behavior, based on compromise and a careful crafting of committee bills, is shown to move
legislative outcomes closer to the committee's preferred outcome.").
74. I am grateful to Saikrishna Prakash for drawing my attention to this parallel.
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ple, Congress used those avenues to shape important provisions
of the agreement involving dispute-resolution, subsidies, uranium, potatoes, lobsters, and steel.7 5 Indeed, because of the unusual "nonmarkup" process used in the Fast Track process, it
was the House and Senate who transmitted the proposed United
States-Canada FTA implementing legislation to the President
(reversing the ordinary legislative process), with the President
simply transmitting it back, word-for-word (with typographical
corrections) eleven days later. 76
Even accounting for this congressional input, however, at
the core of the Fast Track critics' "democracy" objection may lie
the nub of a valid concern, namely, that the Fast Track gives the
President greater freedom to shape trade agreements to his
programmatic agenda than would otherwise be possible under
ordinary legislative process. Whether or not this is in fact true,
the growing congressional and public perception of its truth has
led both to the steady modification of the Fast Track process
over time and to ever-increasing suggestions that the Fast Track
be abrogated. So long as different political parties control the
Presidency and Congress, this perception will likely contribute
to greater and greater pressure to amend the Fast Track .still
further or even to abolish it. In short, the Executive Branch may
soon be faced with a stark choice regarding the Fast Track:
change it or lose it.

III.

THE FUTURE OF THE FAST TRACK

If the Fast Track is to survive as a viable instrument of
United States trade policy, should it be modified, and if so,
how? In Part I, I suggested three de facto amendments that will
now likely become part-and-parcel of any future Fast Track renewal episode: the requirement of some kind of administration
action plan, the coupling of Fast Track approval with "sense of
the Congress" resolutions specifying particular congressional negotiating objectives, and the requirement that all decisions to
extend the Fast Track be voted on the floor, not simply resolved
by the gatekeeper committees. If, as I have suggested, the Fast
75. See Joshua B. Bolten & Rufus H. Yerxa, A Congressional Perspective on the
Implementation Legislation, in BELLO & HOLMER, supra note *, 47, 54-57.
76. See Alan F. Holmer, An Administration Perspective on the Implementation
Legislation, in BELLO & HOLMER, supra note *, 37, 44 [hereinafter Holmer] ("In fact, the
Congress had the ultimate control over the process computers!").

the bill was on congressional
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Track critics' central concern is not so much about democracy or
accountability as a fear of presidential dominance of the trade
agenda, several modifications, ranging from the banal to the dramatic, suggest themselves.
A.

Modifying the Statutory Timetable

The first, most simple change would be to modify the statutory timetable under which the Fast Track currently operates.
As noted above, the current procedures require the President to
give Congress prior notice at least ninety calendar days before
he enters into a trade agreement, but once the agreement and
the implementing bill have been submitted, the Fast Track clock
begins to operate, requiring an up-or-down vote within sixty legislative days. 7" Significantly and appropriately, this statutory
timetable places no minimum or maximum limit on the number
of days after the entering of the agreement within which the
President must submit the agreement to Congress, along with
78
draft implementing legislation.

Even so, this timetable arguably gives Congress too little
time to examine the agreement after presidential notification,
but before it is initialled and entered into, thus creating the possibility that Congress will insist upon changes that render the
draft implementing legislation inconsistent with the initialled
agreement. At the same time, the timetable appears to give Congress too much time to consider the agreement after the draft
implementing legislation has been submitted. At that point, experience shows, the nonmarkups are over, hard interbranch bargaining has been completed, and the texts are not subject to
amendment. The lengthy sixty-legislative-day waiting period
thus serves little purpose, other than providing an opportunity
for opponents of the agreement to scuttle what is essentially a
"done deal" by contemplating modification of the Fast Track
procedures themselves.
77. See Pub. L. No. 100-418 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2903(c)).
78. During the United States-Canada FTA episode, for example, Congress and the
Administration negotiated a timetable whereby the Administration agreed not to submit
the draft bill before June 1, 1988, to allow ample time for consultations with Congress
and resultant modification of the draft implementing bill. In return, the congressional
leadership agreed to schedule a vote on the implementing bill before the end of 1988,
and if possible, before the August recess. Holmer, supra note 75, at 39-40. In fact, it was
not until nearly two months after the agreed-upon date that the President formally
transmitted the implementing legislation, which was enacted unchanged about one
month later by the House and about two months later by the Senate. Id. at 44-45.
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One simple adjustment would thus be to extend the pre-entry notification period to say, 120 calendar days, while shrinking
the post-submission approval period to thirty or forty-five legislative days. This modest adjustment would give Congress more
time to bargain for changes during the crucial period before the
agreement and the implementing bill are introduced, and less
time to quibble after the unamendable legislative package has
been submitted.
B.

Separate Fast-Trackingfor Each Agreement

A second obvious change would be a requirement that different trade agreements not be bundled together for purposes of
receiving Fast Track treatment, whether initial or extended. Until now, individual trade agreements have generally been accorded separate and independent Fast Track authority. 79 But as
noted in Part I, when Fast Track extension is at stake, a quirk
of statutory language in the 1988 Trade Act made it difficult to
decouple the NAFTA from the Uruguay Round. 0 During the extension battle, several efforts were made to decouple the extension of the Fast Track for one accord from the Fast Track extension for the other." Ironically, these efforts were resisted by
many opponents of extension, on the ultimately unsuccessful
theory that "by combining the various trade issues into One Big
Vote. . .opponents can pull together those who want to embarrass Bush, those who do not want a free-trade agreement with
82
Mexico and those who feel threatened by the GATT talks.
In the future, separate legislative approval should be obtained for the fast-tracking of each trade agreement being contemplated, whether initial or extended. When the issue is initial
authorization, separate fast-tracking is required. When the issue
is Fast Track extension, there seems to be no good reason why
79. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(b)(1), however, defines an "implementing bill," which is to be
accorded Fast Track treatment, as "a bill of either House ... which is introduced...
with respect to one or more trade agreements submitted .... " (emphasis added).
80. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 149, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Levin Resolution); Cloud,
Democrats Weigh, supra note 55 (stating that Rep. Terry Bruce planned to introduce a
bill removing the United States-Mexico negotiations from the Fast Track without affecting Uruguay Round); David S. Cloud, Lopsided Vote Seen Signaling Win for Bush on
Fast Track, 49 CONG. Q. 1257, 1260 (1991) (discussing Pease Resolution, which requested
separate House floor vote on rejecting fast track authority for the NAFTA).
82. William Schneider, Trade Vote Will Test Bush's Clout, 23 NAT'L J. 968 (Apr.
20, 1991).
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the President should be free to bundle unrelated accords, which
may result either in the accord with greater legislative support
carrying the less supported one to enactment or in the latter
dragging the former down to legislative defeat.
C. Staged Fast-Tracking
The NAFTA debate illustrated that a significant number of
members were hesitant about according Fast Track treatment,
particularly nonamendability, to an entire agreement in advance
of negotiation, particularly given that labor, environmental,
worker adjustment assistance, dispute-resolution, and foreign
content in goods provisions were likely to become controversial.
This concern led several members to suggest a variety of "middle ground" options between a yes or no vote on blanket extension of the Fast Track. Representative Levin, for example, proposed an amendment of House rules to permit up to four
amendments to the United States-Mexico agreement.8 3 Representative Gephardt proposed some kind of "mid-course review"
before granting Fast Track treatment.14 As noted above, Senator
Riegle, joined by four other Democratic Senators, suggested a
limited amendment option, whereby Senate rules would be adjusted to permit amendments in the five subject matter areas
mentioned above.
Proponents of the Fast Track could object that all of these
options are theoretically available already, simply by ad hoc adjustments of internal Congressional rules. But as the maritime
industry episode during the United States-Canada FTA negotiations demonstrated, such ad hoc adjustments, or threats thereof,
can reintroduce into the trade process precisely the dangers that
the Fast Track was originally designed to prevent: namely, loss
of executive negotiating credibility with our allies and a skewing
of trade agreements to favor powerful interest groups with access to particular key members. On the other hand, there may
well be merit in Representative Levin's notion that there should
be "something between nitpicking and no role at all for Congress" that is between Fast Track authorization and the final
up-or-down vote, particularly for those Members who do not be83. David S. Cloud, Lawmakers Offer Plans To Modify Fast Track, 49 CoNo. Q.
1047 (1991) [hereinafter Cloud, Lawmakers Offer].
84. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, GephardtBacks Effort On Trade With Mexico, N.Y.
TmEs, May 10, 1991, at D2.
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long to the key gatekeeper committees."5
Of the various "middle ground" options already proposed,
Representative Levin's option of permitting a very small number
of subsequent amendments (a limit of four) makes the least
sense. Amendments, after all, are not peremptory challenges,
and Congress as a whole might find it difficult in advance to determine how many amendments it might want to use (not to
mention how many changes to the proposed implementing bill
would constitute a "single amendment"). Perhaps more important, a four-amendment rule would offer our negotiating partners little or no certainty that any particular negotiating provision would not be later modified by the use of one of these
"reserved" amendments. Similarly, a mid-course review, in
which Congress could undo any or all of what has already been
agreed upon, would afford Mexico and Canada no certainty, and
might encourage one or even both sides to delay negotiating the
most controversial issues until after the mid-course review had
occurred. 6
Senator Riegle's proposal, to allow amendments limited to
particular subject matter areas, might provide the best alternative if modified into a proposal for "staged fast-tracking." The
trade statutes could be amended to require the President to
enumerate, in his action plan, the broad subject matter areas to
be negotiated. Congress could then, by a majority vote in each
house, exempt the most controversial areas from Fast Track
treatment until formal submission of an executive progress report at a date certain in the future, while agreeing to accord Fast
Track treatment to the less controversial subject matters. Upon
submission of the progress report, the two Houses could then
take a second vote on whether those issues should also be placed
on the fast track. To create a meaningful opportunity for negotiation outside the shadow of amendability, the dates would need
to be set so that the entire agreement would be subject to Fast
Track treatment for a substantial period - say, six months before its submission to Congress.
The main advantage of this proposal is that it would subdivide the negotiations into those issues which could be negotiated
85. Cloud, Lawmakers Offer, supra note 83, at 1047-48.
86. Witness, for example, the sweeping changes in the Uruguay Round negotiations
that have occurred after the so-called "mid-term review" of December 1988. See, e.g.,
Peter Montagnon & William Duilforce, The Home Stretch in the Trade Stakes, FIN.
TIMES, April 10, 1989, at 1-20.

BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XVIII:I

with assurances that Fast Track treatment could be forthcoming, and those which would proceed under greater uncertainty,
but with knowledge that the issue of Fast Track treatment
would be resolved by a date certain. The progress-report deadline could be used as a spur for negotiating difficult issues in the
same way that the Fast Track expiration deadline currently
does.
The proposal's disadvantages are equally obvious. Staging
would subdivide the trade agreement into two (or conceivably
more) packages and thereby make it difficult for the negotiators
to trade off concessions in the less controversial areas (e.g., tariff
reductions) against those in the more controversial ones (e.g.,
environmental issues). It may be unrealistic to believe, and unwise to require, that certain issues be fully negotiated, then
closed, before turning to the negotiation of other, inevitably related issues. Furthermore, staging would withhold Fast Track
treatment at the outset for precisely those issues on which our
negotiating partners would most desire certainty of
nonamendability at the outset. Finally, the modification would
certainly stimulate executive cries of congressional
micromanagement and claims of unconstitutional congressional
interference with the President's authority to conduct negotiations. Many Executive Branch officials insist that any possibility
of post-negotiation amendment

-

however limited -

will

wholly gut the Fast Track's usefulness by destroying the Executive's negotiating credibility with our allies.
While these are serious objections, the alternative could be
far worse: that Congress would accord Fast Track treatment at
the outset of negotiations but then remove it on an ad hoc basis
upon seeing how a particular issue is being negotiated. Staged
Fast-Tracking simply recognizes the reality that in most trade
negotiations, some issues will be especially controversial and
should perhaps be subject to more extended debate before voting. If staging provisions were written into the statute, all parties would be assured of somewhat greater notice of likely problem areas and given an incentive to make progress on those
issues by a date certain, thereby reducing the uncertainties that
a wholly ad hoc process would introduce.
D. Reserving the Fast Track for MultilateralAccords
Yet another possibility would be to reserve the Fast Track
for the multilateral context in which it originated, while using a
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staged or otherwise modified Fast Track for bilateral accords.,,
The rationale would be that complex multilateral accords like
the Uruguay Round simply could not reach closure if they were
amendable or even staged, because amending even a single provision might pull down the entire house of cards. In bilateral
accords, by contrast, Congress and President may be more likely
to be able to gauge at the outset of negotiations how much the
other side wants the agreement, and whether the uncertainty of
possible amendment would likely dissuade that country from negotiating altogether. It seems likely, for example, that Mexico
(like Israel before it) is sufficiently interested in concluding an
FTA with the United States that it will agree to negotiate with
the Executive even without the Fast Track guarantee, thus tolerating the possibility of post-negotiation congressional
amendment."s
This prediction could be challenged on the ground that any
comprehensive FTA, whether multilateral or bilateral, will energize a broad range of interest groups, thus creating the need for
nonamendable Fast Track treatment. Furthermore, this possibility raises the spectre that the Fast Track device would become a
rich man's procedure, a privilege the United States would grant
only to negotiating partners with whom there is a rough parity
of bargaining power. As a counterexample, however, one could
cite the United States-U.S.S.R. bilateral arms control treaties,
important and complex agreements that have been negotiated
between parties of comparable bargaining strength, largely without any Fast Track process. Particularly if the statutory modification did not eliminate the possibility of Fast Track treatment
for bilateral accords, but simply deferred it until after the submission of a progress report after some period of initial negotiations (as in the staging proposal), this option might succeed in
preserving the Fast Track for the multilateral negotiations for
which it has become a sine qua non.
87. Numerous members have endorsed some variant of this view. See Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (May 15, 1991) (Senator Mitchell); 137 CONG. REc. H3500 (daily ed. May
23, 1991) (remarks of Representative Pease) (Fast Track "is warranted when negotiating
trade agreements with as many as 107 partners"); 137 CONG. REC. at S6598-99 (remarks
of Senator Sarbanes); 137 CoNG. REC. S6787 (daily ed. May 24, 1991) (remarks of Senator Kennedy); 137 CONG. REC. at S6825 (remarks of Senator Biden) ("Fast track was
designed with multilateral negotiations in mind.").
88. See 137 CONG. REC. S6602-03 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (remarks of Senator Metzenbaum noting that Mexican newspaper had quoted chief Mexican negotiator as saying
"With the [F]ast [T]rack or without it, in any case the negotiations will be carried out").
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Statutory Modifications to Coopt Potential Mavericks

One curious omission from the current Fast Track procedures is the exclusion of the Senate Rules and Administration
Committee from the group of committees that determines Fast
Track extension."9 To the extent that that committee helps determine the Senate rules being applied at any time, it has power
to bypass the Fast Track procedure altogether if its members
feel that their interests have been ignored or overridden in battles conducted within the statutorily authorized Fast Track process. If, as I believe, framework legislation facilitates the development of settled expectations, orderly procedures, and mutual
compliance with interbranch accords, 90 then including the Senate Rules Committee by law in the "gatekeeping group" may
have the desirable effect of cooptation and informal estoppel.
While inclusion would make the process even more unwieldy, it
might also diminish the chance of ad hoc abrogation of the Fast
Track.
Edmund Sim has made a similar proposal for coopting another set of potential mavericks: the other congressional committees that have competing jurisidictional claims over portions
of the agreement. Rather than allowing each interested committee to conduct its own separate nonmarkup - a Senate Finance
Committee practice that began with the Tokyo Round and has
persisted to this day - Sim proposes that as a matter of internal practice, the gatekeeper committees follow the House Ways
and Means Committee custom of conducting a "supernonmarkup" and demanding that other committees who are interested in the trade accord at issue waive their jurisdictional
claims over those issues as the price for being allowed to
participate."'
Both of these ideas grow out of a common strategy: that the
best way to preserve a statutory Fast Track procedure is to coopt those potentially maverick committees who might be in a
position later to effectuate ad hoc bypassing of the statute
89. See Sim, supra note 9, at 523.
90. See KOH, supra note 36, at 207 ("Formal framework legislation.

.

. [is] a public

act, jointly legitimated by Congress and the president, comprehensive in scope, and not
subject to momentary abandonment [which] inform[s] all observers of the institutional
.. . allocation of decision-making responsibility and . . . protects settled expectations
by providing higher assurance of mutual compliance.").
91. See Sim, supra note 9, at 523. Alternatively, the demand could be made by the
congressional leadership.
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through internal rules changes. If these modifications were
adopted by statutory amendment, they could be voted on by all
members, behind at least a partial veil of ignorance as to how
these changes would affect their own constituents. In that context, members would be more likely to adopt a uniform procedure that would be less hostage to special-interest-group influence than an ad hoc rules modification of the kind attempted by
the maritime lobby during the United States-Canada FTA talks.
F. Permitting Committee
Amendment

Amendment,

But

Not

Floor

A final possible modification of the current Fast Track procedure would allow the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committee to offer a limited number of amendments to a
negotiated agreement within a narrowly defined time window
(say five legislative days), but to still require that those committees deliver the amended implementing bill to the floor under a
closed (no-amendment) rule. The proposal would satisfy the
concerns of those who want to preserve some later amendment
option, but would not make a trade accord subject to free floor
amendment. To limit the proposal even further, the statute
could require the gatekeeping committees to "reserve" possible
subject matter areas for future amendment at the time that they
grant the agreement as a whole access to the Fast Track, much
as I have suggested under the Staged Fast-Tracking proposal described above.
As with the Staged Fast-Tracking proposal, the disadvantage of this proposal is that it would further enhance the power
of the gatekeeping committees and disrupt our negotiating partners' certainty that the accord to which they agree will not be
amended. More fundamentally, the drive for amendments, once
loosed, will not be easily cabined. But only time will tell,
whether allowing limited amendment will invariably amount to
allowing the camel's nose under the edge of the tent. The committees granted this limited amendment power would include all
of the congressional trade experts, especially those members
most likely to have directly observed or participated in the negotiations themselves, and therefore the number of amendments
introduced might be relatively small. In the best case, the members with power of postnegotiation amendment would also be
the ones most likely to have a broader vision of how a particular
trade pact would or would not fit into the landscape of our inter-
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national trade policy, thus acting as a counterweight to interestgroup pressure. Thus, if Congress demands some amendment
option as the price for maintaining the Fast Track, the committee amendment option may prove to be the most palatable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The recent Fast Track extension battle illustrates both how
central the Fast Track has become to United States trade policy
and how fragile it has become as a device for confining political
expediency on the part of both branches. Although the "democracy objection" lodged against it during the recent episode is
largely unfounded, there may be a nub of valid concern that
warrants further modification to the process. It may well be that
no amount of statutory tinkering can save a procedure whose
useful life has now passed. At some point, the Fast Track provisions may become so barnacled with amendments and congressional control devices that it will no longer serve its intended
purposes, at which point one or both branches will no doubt
urge that it simply be jettisoned. But, while memories of the
most recent Fast Track battle are still fresh, there is no reason
why creative lawyers and legislators should not think hard about
which aspects of this remarkable procedural innovation are
worth saving and worth revising.

